One of the authors has recently propounded an SR (semantic realism) model which shows, circumventing known no-go theorems, that an objective (noncontextual, hence local) interpretation of quantum mechanics (QM) is possible. We consider here compound physical systems and show why the proofs of nonlocality of QM do not hold within the SR model. We also discuss quantum measurement theory within this model, note that the objectification problem disappears since the measurement of any property simply reveals its unknown value, and show that the projection postulate can be considered as an approximate law, valid FAPP (for all practical purposes). Finally, we provide an intuitive justification for some unusual features of the SR model.
Introduction
One of us has recently proposed an SR model which provides an interpretation of quantum mechanics (QM) that is objective. (1) Intuitively, objectivity means that, according to our interpretation, any measurement of a physical property of an individual sample of a given physical system reveals a preexisting value of the measured property, that does not depend on the measurements that are carried out on the sample. 1 The SR model is inspired by a series of more general papers aiming to supply an SR interpretation of QM that is realistic in a semantic sense, in the framework of an epistemological position called Semantic Realism (briefly, SR; see, e.g., Refs. [2] [3] [4] [5] : indeed, it shows how an SR interpretation can be consistently constructed. However, the SR model is presented in Ref. 1 by using only the standard language of QM, in order to make it understandable even to physicists that are not interested in the conceptual subtelties of the general theory. But the treatment in Ref. 1 does not deal explicitly with the special case of compound physical systems, hence neither the measurement problem nor the locality/nonlocality problem are considered, even though the locality of the interpretation of QM provided by the SR model is anticipated. Therefore, we intend to discuss briefly these topics in the present paper.
Our analysis begins with some preliminaries. We discuss in Sec. 2 the concept of physical property from a logical viewpoint, stress that properties 1 More rigorously, objectivity can be intended as a purely semantic notion, as follows. Any physical theory is stated by means of a general language which contains a theoretical language L T and an observative language L O . The former constitutes the formal apparatus of the theory and contains terms denoting theoretical entities (as probability amplitudes, electromagnetic fields, etc.). The latter is linked to L T by means of correspondence rules that provide an indirect and partial interpretation of L T on L O . Furthermore, L O is interpreted by means of assignment rules which make some symbols of L O correspond to macroscopic entities (as preparing and measuring devices, outcomes, etc.), so that the elementary sentences of L O are verifiable, or testable, since they state verifiable properties of individual objects of the kind considered by the theory (note that this does not imply that also the molecular sentences of L O are testable). On the basis of these assigments, a truth theory is (often implicitly) adopted that defines truth values for some or all sentences of L O . Then, we say that physical properties are objective in the given theory if the truth values of all elementary sentences of L O are defined independently of the knowledge of them that one can attain by means of suitable measurements (for instance, the correspondence theory of truth reaches this goal by means of a set-theoretical model). It is interesting to note that such a semantic conception of objectivity entails only a form of observative, or macroscopic, realism, even if it is compatible with more demanding forms of realism.
having different logical orders correspond to different kinds of experimental procedures, and note that the properties represented by projection operators in standard QM or in the SR model are first order properties only; we also point out that, even if every state S of the physical system can be associated with a first order property (the support F S of S), recognizing an unknown state requires experimental procedures corresponding to higher order properties, which is relevant to the treatment of the measurement problem, as we show in Sec. 6 . Furthermore, we briefly analyze in Sec. 3 some typical proofs of nonlocality of standard QM and individuate in them a common general scheme, notwithstanding their differences.
Bearing in mind the above preliminaries, we deal with the locality problem from the viewpoint of the SR model in Sec. 4 . We note that the objective interpretation of QM provided by the SR model supplies an intuitive local picture of the physical world and avoids a number of paradoxes, since objectivity implies locality. But this entails that the arguments examined in Sec. 3 must fail to hold, otherwise one would get a contradiction. Thus, we dedicate the rest of Sec. 4 to show that the proofs of nonlocality in Sec. 3 are actually invalid within the SR model, so that no inconsistency occurs. As a byproduct of our analysis, we get that Bell's inequalities do not provide a test for distinguishing local realistic theories from QM.
We then come to quantum measurements and observe in Sec. 5 that the SR model avoids the main problem of standard quantum measurement theory, i.e., the objectification problem; we also note that measurements still play a nonclassical role according to the SR model, since choosing a specific measurement establishes which properties can be known and which remain unknown, but point out some relevant differences between this perspective and the standard QM viewpoint. Moreover, we show in Sec. 6 that the further problem of double (unitary/nonunitary) evolution of quantum measurement theory disappears within the SR model, since the projection postulate can be considered as an approximate empirical law that is valid for all practical purposes; we also discuss some consequences of this postulate that illustrate further the differences existing between the interpretation of the measuring process according to the SR model and the standard interpretation.
Finally, we provide in Sec. 7 an intuitive picture that justifies some relevant features of the SR model by modifying the extended SR model, (1) in which microscopic properties are introduced as theoretical entities.
Physical properties, states and supports
Consider the following sets of statements in the standard language of physics.
(i) "The energy of the system falls in the interval [a,b]". "The system has energy E and momentum p at time t".
(ii) "The energy of the system falls in the interval [a,b] with frequency f whenever the system is in the state S". "If the system has energy E, then its momentum is p with frequency f ". (iii) "The energy of the system falls in the interval [a,b] with a frequency that is maximal in the state S". "If the system has energy E, then its momentum is p with a frequency that is maximal whenever the system is in the state S".
All these statements express, in some sense, "physical properties" of a physical system. But these properties have not the same logical status, correspond to conceptually different experimental apparatuses, and a careful analysis of their differences is useful if one wants to discuss the objective interpretation of QM provided by the SR model in the case of compound physical systems. Therefore, let us preliminarily observe that the word system in the above statements actually means individual sample of a given physical system, or physical object according to the terminology introduced in the SR model (indeed the term physical system is commonly used in the standard language of physics for denoting both classes of physical objects and individual samples, leaving to the context the charge of making clear the specific meaning that is adopted). Then, let us note that the first statement in (i) assigns the property F=having energy that falls in the interval [a,b] to a physical object, while the second statement assigns the properties E=having energy E at time t, P=having momentum p at time t. The properties F, E, P are first order properties from a logical viewpoint, since they apply to individual samples, and each of them can be tested (in a given laboratory) by means of a single measurement performed by a suitable ideal dichotomic registering device having outcomes 0 and 1 (of course, E and P can be tested conjointly only if they are commeasurable).
Let us come to the statements in (ii). These assign second order properties to ensembles of physical objects. To be precise, in the first statement one considers the ensemble of objects that possess the property F and the ensemble of objects that are in the state S, and the second order property regards the number of objects in their intersection, which must be such that its ratio with the number of the objects in S is f. Analogously, in the second statement one considers the ensemble of objects that possess the property E and the ensemble of objects that possess the property P, and the second order property regards the number of objects in their intersection, which must by such that its ratio with the number of objects that possess the property E is f. The first of these properties can be tested by producing a given number of physical objects in the state S, performing measurements of the first order property F on its elements, counting the objects that have the property F, and then calculating a relative frequency. The second property can be tested by means of analogous procedures (which require measurements of first order properties on a number of objects) if E and P are compatible, while there is no procedure testing it in standard QM if E and P are not compatible.
Finally, the statements in (iii) assign third order properties to sets of ensembles. The property in the first statement can be tested (in a given laboratory) by producing sets of ensembles, performing measurements of first order properties on all elements of each ensemble, calculating frequencies, and finally comparing the obtained results. The property in the second statement requires analogous procedures, which may exist or not, depending on the compatibility of E and P.
It is now apparent that one could take into account further statements containing properties of still higher order. Our discussion however is sufficient to prove the main point here: properties of different logical orders appear in the common language of physics, and properties that are different when looked at from this logical viewpoint are also different from a physical viewpoint. Of course, nothing prohibits that a first order property F be attributed to some or all elements of an ensemble of physical objects: but first order properties must be distinguished from higher order properties, and, in particular, from correlation properties, which usually are second order properties that establish relations among first order properties (the example above shows that the measurement of a property of this kind requires the comparison of sets of results obtained by measuring first order properties). We shall see that this distinction is relevant when dealing with the measurement problem in Sec. 5.
From a mathematical viewpoint, only first order properties are represented directly within standard QM. To be precise, let (L(H),≤) be the lattice of all orthogonal projection operators on the Hilbert space H of a physical system, and let L be the set of all first order properties of the system. According to standard QM, every element of (L(H),≤) represents bijectively (in absence of superselection rules) an element of L. For the sake of brevity, we call any element of L physical property, or simply property, in the following, omitting the reference to the logical order.
The set L can be endowed with the partial order induced on it by the order ≤ defined on L(H) (that we still denote by ≤), and the lattice (L,≤) is usually called the lattice of properties of the system. It follows that every pure state S can be associated with a minimal property F S ∈ L that is often called the support of S in the literature (see, e.g., Ref. 6) . To be precise, if S is represented in H by the vector | ϕ , F S is the property represented by the one-dimensional projection operator P ϕ = | ϕ ϕ |, which obviously is such that P ϕ ≤ P for every P ∈ L(H) such that ||P| ϕ || 2 = 1. It is then apparent that F S can be characterized as the property that is possessed by a physical object x with certainty (i.e., with probability 1) only if x is in the state S. Indeed, for every vector | ϕ ′ representing a pure state S ′ , one gets
The existence of a support for every pure state of a physical system is linked with the problem of distinguishing different pure states, or pure states from mixtures, in standard QM. Indeed, there is no way in this theory for recognizing experimentally the state S of a single physical object x whenever this state is not known (we consider here pure states only for the sake of brevity): even if one measures on x an observable A that has S as an eigenstate corresponding to a nondegenerate eigenvalue a, and gets just a (equivalently, if one tests the support F S of S and gets that F S is possessed by x), one cannot assert that the state of x was S before the measurement, since there are many states that could yield outcome a and yet are different from S (to be precise, all states that are represented by vectors that are not orthogonal to the vector representing S). But if one accepts the definition of states as equivalence classes of preparing devices propounded by Ludwig (and incorporated within the SR model (1) ) one can know whether a given preparing device π prepares physical objects in the state S (briefly, one can recognize S) by measuring mean values of suitable observables, which is obviously equivalent to testing second order properties. The simplest way of doing that in standard QM is testing F S on a huge ensemble of objects prepared by π by means of an ideal dichotomic device r : indeed, π belongs to the state S if and only if r gives outcome 1 on all samples, which means that the mean value of F S is 1, or, equivalently, that F S is possessed with certainty by every physical object x prepared by π. It is then apparent that, whenever S is an entangled state, this procedure allows one to distinguish devices preparing physical objects in the state S from devices preparing physical objects in the mixture M S corresponding to S via biorthogonal decomposition (see, e.g., Ref. 7) . Also this remark is relevant to the quantum theory of measurement (see Sec. 5).
Nonlocality within standard QM
The issue of nonlocality of QM was started by a famous paper by Einstein, Podolski and Rosen (EPR), (8) which however had different goals: indeed, it aimed to show that some reasonable assumptions, among which locality, imply that standard QM is not complete (in a very specific sense introduced by the authors), hence it can not be considered as a final theory of microworld. Later on, the thought experiment proposed by EPR, regarding two physical systems that have interacted in the past, was reformulated by Bohm (9) and a number of further thought experiments inspired by it were suggested and used in order to point out the conflict between standard QM and locality. Hence, one briefly says that standard QM is a nonlocal theory.
As anticipated in Sec. 1, we want to schematize some typical proofs of nonlocality in this section, in order to prepare the ground to our criticism in Sec. 4. For the sake of clearness, we proceed by steps.
(1) The existing proofs of nonlocality of QM can be grouped in two classes (see, e.g., Ref 10) . (i) The proofs showing that deterministic local theories are inconsistent with QM. (ii) The more general proofs showing that stochastic local theories (which include deterministic local theories) are inconsistent with QM. For the sake of brevity, we will only consider the proofs in (i) . It is indeed rather easy to extend our analysis and criticism to the proofs in (ii) .
(2) We denote by QPL in the following a set of empirical quantum laws, which may be void (we classify here as empirical those physical laws that can be directly checked, at least in principle, by means of suitable experiments, such as, for instance, the relations among compatible observables mentioned in the KS condition: (1) of course, any physical theory contains also theoretical laws, that cannot be checked directly and that can be looked at as schemes of laws, the role of which is producing, by deduction, empirical laws). We denote by LOC the assumption that QM is a local theory (in the standard EPR sense that a measurement on one of many spatially separated subsystems of a compound physical system does not affect the properties of the other subsystems 2 ). Finally, we denote by R the following assumption.
R. The values of all physical properties of any physical object are predetermined for any measurement context.
(3) Bearing in mind the definitions in (2), the general scheme of a typical proof of nonlocality is the following.
Firstly, one proves that QPL and LOC and R ⇒ (not QM), or, equivalently, QM ⇒ (not QPL) or (not LOC) or (not R). Secondly, since QM ⇒ QPL, one gets QM ⇒ (not LOC) or (not R).
Finally, one proves that QM and (not R) ⇒ (not LOC), so that one concludes QM ⇒ (not LOC).
(4) Let us consider some proofs of nonlocality and show that they actually follow the scheme in (3).
Bell's original proof. (11) Here, the Bohm variant of the EPR thought experiment is considered (which refers to a compound system made up by a pair of spin-1/2 particles formed somehow in the singlet spin state and moving freely in opposite directions). Then, a Bell's inequality concerning some expectation values (hence a physical law linking second order properties, see Sec. 2) is deduced by using assumptions LOC and R together with a perfect correlation law (PC: if the measurement on one of the particles gives the result spin up along the u direction, then a measurement on the other particle gives the result spin down along the same direction), which is an empirical law linking first order properties and following from the general theoretical laws of QM. The deduction is based on the fact that assumption R allows one to introduce hidden variables specifying the state of a physical system in a more complete way with respect to the quantum mechanical state. Then, the expectation values predicted by QM are substituted in the Bell's inequality and found to violate it.
The above procedure can be summarized by the implication PC and LOC and R ⇒ (not QM), which matches the first step in the general scheme, with PC representing QPL in this particular case. One thus obtains QM ⇒ (not LOC) or (not R) and concludes that QM contradicts local realism. The last step in the scheme was not done explicitly by Bell and can be carried out by adopting, for instance, the proof that PC and LOC ⇒ R (hence PC and (not R) ⇒ (not LOC)) propounded by Redhead. (12) We add that the same paradigm, with PC as a special case of QPL, occurs in different proofs, as Wigner's (13) and Sakurai's. (14) In these proofs, however, an inequality is deduced (still briefly called Bell's inequality) that concerns probabilities rather than expectation values.
Clauser et al.'s proof. (15) This proof introduces a generalized Bell's inequality, sometimes called BCHSH's inequality, that concerns expectation values (hence it expresses a physical law linking second order properties, as Bell's inequality). This inequality is compared with the predictions of QM, finding contradictions. BCHSH's inequality is deduced by using LOC and R only, so that one proves that LOC and R ⇒ (not QM), hence QPL is void in this case. The rest of the proof can be carried out as in the general scheme.
Greenberger et al.'s proof. (16) Here no inequality is introduced. A system of four correlated spin-1/2 particles is considered, and the authors use directly a perfect correlation law PC 1 (that generalizes the PC law mentioned above), R and LOC 3 in order to obtain a contradiction with another perfect correlation law PC 2 , hence with QM. Thus, the authors prove that PC 1 and LOC and R ⇒ (not QM), which matches the first step in the general scheme, with PC 1 representing QPL in this case. Again, the rest of the proof can be carried out as in the general scheme.
Mermin's proof. (17) Also this proof does not introduce inequalities. The author takes into account a system of three different spin-1/2 particles, assumes a quantum physical law linking first order properties (the product of four suitably chosen dichotomic nonlocal observables is equal to -1) together with LOC and (implicitly) R, and shows that this law cannot be fulfilled together with other similar laws following from QM. Thus, also Mermin proves an implication of the form QPL and LOC and R ⇒ (not QM), from which the argument against LOC can be carried out as in the general scheme.
(5) The analysis in (4) shows that the scheme in (3) provides the general structure of the existing proofs of nonlocality. In this scheme, assumptions R and LOC play a crucial role. Let us therefore close our discussion by comparing R and LOC with the assumption of objectivity (briefly, O), which plays instead a crucial role in the proofs of contextuality of standard QM. (5) Let us note firstly that assumption R expresses a minimal form of realism. This realism can be meant in a purely semantic sense, as objectivity (see Sec. 1), hence it is compatible with various forms of ontological realism (as the assumption about the existence of elements of reality in the EPR argument 4 ) but does not imply them. (4) Yet, R is weaker than O. 5 Indeed, O entails that the values of physical properties are independent of the measuring apparatuses (noncontextuality), while R may hold also in a contextual theory (as Bohm's), since it requires only that the values of physical properties are not brought into being by the very act of measuring them.
Let us note then that O also implies LOC, since it entails in particular that the properties of the subsystems of a compound physical system exist independently of any measurement. By putting this implication together with the implication O ⇒ R, one gets O ⇒ LOC and R. However, the converse implication does not hold, since R and LOC are compatible with the existence of measurements that do not influence each other at a distance but influence locally the values of the properties that are measured. Thus, we conclude that R and LOC are globally weaker than O.
Recovering locality within the SR model
It is well known that nonlocality of standard QM raises a number of problems and paradoxes. However, it has been proven in several papers (see, e.g., Refs. 4 and 18-20) that the general SR interpretation of QM invalidates some typical proofs of nonlocality. Basing on our analysis in Sec. 3, we want to attain in this section a similar result within the framework of the SR model, which has the substantial advantage of avoiding a number of logical and epistemological notions, making things clear within the standard language of QM. To this end, we use throughout in the following the definitions and concepts introduced in Ref. 1. It is important to observe that we are led to question the proofs of nonlocality not only for general theoretical reasons (in particular, attaining a more intuitive local picture of the physical world) but also to avoid inconsistencies. Indeed, as we have anticipated in Sec. 1, the proofs in Sec. 3 raise a consistency problem. For, should they be valid within the SR model, QM would be a nonlocal theory also according to this model: but, then, the model could not provide an objective interpretation of QM, since objectivity entails both R and LOC (see (5) in Sec. 3).
For the sake of clearness, we again proceed by steps.
(1) To begin with, let us summarize some features of the SR model. Firstly, the main feature of the model is the introduction of a no-registration outcome a 0 for every physical observable A 0 (which is an old idea) that is interpreted as a possible result of a measurement of A 0 providing information about the physical object that is measured (which introduces a new perspective, since the occurrence of a 0 is usually attributed to a lack of efficiency of the measuring apparatus). The family of properties associated with an observable A 0 is then
Secondly, states are defined as in standard QM, and all properties are assumed to be objective, hence the information about a physical object x following from the knowledge of its state is incomplete. Thus, there is a set of properties that are possessed by all objects in the state S (the set of properties that are certainly true in S, see Sec. 5), but different objects in S may differ because of further properties. One can then focus on some additional properties, take them (together with S) as initial, or boundary, conditions, and consider the subset of all objects in S that possess them. Different choices of the additional properties lead to consider different subsets (which may intersect). We briefly say that one can consider different physical situations. It is then apparent that these situations can be partitioned in two basically different classes. Indeed, one can choose as additional properties the property of being detected and some further properties (possibly none) that are pairwise commeasurable: in this case an accessible physical situation occurs. On the contrary, if one chooses the property of being not detected or some further properties that are not pairwise commeasurable, a nonaccessible physical situation occurs.
Thirdly, properties are represented by projection operators, as in standard QM, but the representation is not one-to-one, since the properties (A 0 ,∆), with a 0 / ∈ ∆, and (A 0 ,∆ ∪ {a 0 }) are represented by the same operator. Finally, the following nonclassical Metatheoretical Generalized Principle holds within the SR model (the same principle was stated in a number of previous papers, basing on general arguments, see, e.g., Refs. 3 and 5). MGP. A physical statement expressing an empirical (quantum) physical law is true in all accessible physical situations, but it may be false (as well as true) in nonaccessible physical situations.
(2) MGP is an epistemological principle regarding the range of validity of physical laws, and it implies a change in our way of looking at the laws of QM, not a change in the laws themselves. Moreover, it provides the main argument against the standard proofs of nonlocality, that thus are criticized from an epistemological rather than from a technical viewpoint. Thus, MGP plays a crucial role within the SR model, and it may be useful to reconsider here some arguments that suggest introducing it.
Let us begin by making clear the distinction between empirical and theoretical physical laws that is presupposed by MGP. In any theory, hence in QM, a law is said to be empirical if it is obtained from theoretical laws of the formal apparatus of the theory via correspondence rules and is expressed by a testable sentence of the observative language of the theory (see footnote 1), so that it may undergo a process of empirical control (theoretical laws can then be seen as schemes of laws, from which empirical laws can be deduced (21) ). This definition, however, does not mean that an empirical law can always be checked. Let us consider, for example, a quantum law in which only commuting projection operators (representing first order properties) appear. Whenever x is a physical object (in a state S) that is detected, the properties corresponding to projection operators can be defined unambiguously. If, furthermore, x is selected so that it possesses additional properties that are pairwise commeasurable (see (1)), and these are pairwise commeasurable with all properties appearing in the law, an accessible physical situation occurs, and one can check both whether x actually has all the hypothesized properties and whether the law holds. On the contrary, whenever x is not detected, or it is detected but is selected so that it possesses additional properties that are not pairwise commeasurable with the properties appearing in the law, a nonaccessible physical situation occurs, and it is impossible either to make a check (if x is not detected) or to check both whether x has the hypothesized properties and whether the law holds (if x is detected). Hence, it is consistent with the operational philosophy of QM to assume that in the latter situation the validity of the law cannot be asserted.
The above argument in favor of MGP makes reference to quantum laws linking first order properties only. However, MGP can be justified also in the case of more general empirical quantum laws, and we supply some hints on this topic in the following.
(3) Let us come now to our criticism of the standard proofs of nonlocality. Because of our analysis in Sec. 3, (4), this criticism can be carried out by referring to the scheme in Sec. 3, (3). Let us firstly show that the standard proofs of nonlocality are criticizable even if the SR model is ignored. To this end, note that also assumption R, though weaker than objectivity, implies that nonaccessible physical situations can be envisaged. Indeed, it follows from R that a value is defined for every property of a physical object x and for every measurement context, so that it is sufficient to consider a set of noncommeasurable properties for hypothesizing a situation of this kind. Moreover, direct inspection shows that the scheme in Sec. 3, (3) is not complete. Indeed, all proofs of nonlocality considered in Sec. 3, (4) use, besides the explicit assumptions stated in the scheme, the implicit assumption that all empirical quantum laws can be applied to physical objects in every physical situation, be it accessible or not. This assumption is problematic if viewed at from a standard operational quantum viewpoint, since it introduces within QM a classical conception of empirical physical laws (we therefore call it Metatheoretical Classical Principle or briefly MCP, (3) in the following 6 ).
Let us come, however, to the SR model. Within this model, objectivity implies that accessible and nonaccessible physical situations must be introduced, and MCP is proven to break down by means of an example, while the weaker MGP holds. Thus, the proofs in Sec. 3, (4) are invalid and the consistency problem pointed out at the beginning of this section is avoided.
In order to complete our argument, it remains to point out where each of the aforesaid proofs uses MCP. Let us discuss this issue in some details.
(4) Firstly, let us consider Bell's, (11) Wigner's (13) and Sakurai's (14) proofs. Here, it is immediate to see that the PC law is applied repeatedly to physical objects that are assumed to possess spin up along non-parallel directions.
Hence, this law is directly applied in nonaccessible physical situations, implicitly adopting MCP and violating MGP.
Secondly, let us consider Clauser's et al.'s (15) proof. This proof deserves special attention, since no physical law linking first order properties is used in it. Therefore, let us observe that the generalized Bell's inequality contains a sum of expectation values in which noncompatible observables occur. Hence, every expectation value must be evaluated making reference to different sets of physical objects: all objects are prepared in the same entangled state (to be precise, the singlet state), but in each set only commeasurable physical properties are measured, which differ from set to set. The same procedure is needed if the quantum inequality corresponding to the BCHSH inequality is considered. Yet, according to the SR model, the expectation values in the BCHSH inequality are evaluated taking into account all physical objects in each set. On the contrary, the quantum rules provide probabilities referring to accessible situations only, (1) hence the expectation values in the quantum inequality must be evaluated taking into account only the subsets of objects that are actually detected in each set. These subsets are selected by apparatuses that differ from set to set, and could be unfair statistical samples of the whole set to which they belong, since in each set the measurements select, because of the no-registration outcome that can occur, (1) a subset of physical objects in which the statistical relations among the measured properties can be different from the relations that hold in the original set and from the relations that hold in the other sets. Thus, the BCHSH and the quantum inequality cannot be identified, and no contradiction with QM occurs.
Note that we have avoided using MGP in the above argument since MGP has not been justified explicitly in the case of empirical laws linking second order properties (see (2) ; it is interesting to observe that the same argument can be used in order to justify MGP in more general cases). But if one accepts MGP, one can simply say that the quantum predictions on probabilities can be invalid, because of MGP, if also physical objects in nonaccessible physical situations are considered, as in the BCHSH inequality: hence, identifying this with the corresponding quantum inequality violates MGP.
Thirdly, let us consider Greenberger et al.'s (16) proof. Here, different perfect correlation laws PC 1 and PC 2 are applied to the same physical object, and the properties in PC 1 are not all commeasurable with the properties in PC 2 . Hence a nonaccessible physical situation is envisaged in which PC 1 and PC 2 are assumed to be valid, implicitly adopting MCP and violating MGP.
Finally, let us consider the Mermin's (17) proof. Here, different quantum laws are applied to a given physical object, and there are observables in some of the laws that are not compatible (in the standard sense of QM) with some observables in the other laws. From the viewpoint of the SR model, this produces a nonaccessible physical situation in which some empirical physical laws are assumed to be valid, implicitly adopting MCP and violating MGP. (5) Coming back to the scheme in Sec. 3, (3), our arguments in (3) and (4) can be summarized by saying that the implication QPL and LOC and R ⇒ (not QM) must be substituted by QPL and LOC and R and MCP ⇒ (not QM), which does not hold within the SR model (and is criticizable even within standard QM, see (3)), so that (not LOC) does not follow from QM.
We note explicitly that one can still object that our arguments in (3) are not conclusive. Indeed, objectivity does not imply only R and LOC, as pointed out in Sec. 3, (5), but also the weaker assumptions that are introduced when considering local stochastic theories (as the factorization of probabilities in objective local theories, see, e.g., Ref. 10 ), so that one should still show that the proofs that these theories are inconsistent with QM are invalid within the SR model. As we have anticipated in Sec. 3, (1), however, it is easy to extend our arguments in (3) in order to attain this invalidation.
(6) The result obtained in (3) raises, in particular, the problem of the role of Bell's inequalities. Indeed, these inequalities are usually maintained to provide crucial tests for discriminating between local realism and QM (see, e.g., Refs. 7 and 23). One may then wonder about what would happen, according to the SR model, if one should perform a test of a Bell's inequality: would it be violated or not? The answer is that there are basically two kinds of Bell's inequalities, as our analysis in Sec. 3, (4) shows. Those obtained from assumptions LOC and R only, as BCHSH's inequality, are correct theoretical formulas which are not epistemically accessible, hence cannot be tested (see also Refs. 4 and 24, where however the original Bell's inequality was not classified properly). Any physical experiment tests something else (correlations among commeasurable properties of physical objects that are actually detected), hence yields the results predicted by QM. No contradiction occurs, since the inequalities that can be tested in QM could be identified with Bell's inequalities only violating MGP. Thus, the latter inequalities do not provide methods for testing experimentally whether either QM or local realism is correct, according to the SR model. But the difference between quantum inequalities and Bell's inequalities proves that some quantum laws regarding compound systems fail to hold in nonaccessible physical situations.
The above arguments do not apply to the inequalities that are deduced by using repeatedly a non void set QPL of empirical quantum laws besides R and LOC. These inequalities are simply incorrect according to the SR model, since they are deduced by applying QPL in nonaccessible physical situations.
Objectivity and measurement
The objective interpretation of QM provided by the SR model avoids from the very beginning the main problem of the quantum theory of measurement, i.e. the objectification problem. Indeed, it allows one to interpret a measurement of a property F on a physical object x as an inquiry about whether F is possessed or not by x, not as an objectification of F. Generally speaking, this brings back the measurement problem to classical terms.
It must be stressed, however, that some typical quantum features do not disappear in the SR model. In particular, the existence of a non-trivial commeasurability relation prohibits one from testing all properties possessed by a given physical object x conjointly, so that the knowledge of all properties of x in a given state cannot be provided by any measurement. It is thus interesting to inquire further into the knowledge of properties that one attains when the state of x is specified. Therefore, let us suppose that x is in the (pure) state S represented by the vector | ϕ 7 . It is easy to see that in the SR model (as in standard QM) a subset E S exists, made up by properties that are certainly true in S (that is, have probability 1 in S). To be precise, E S contains all properties of the form (A 0 ,∆) such that:
(i) A 0 is a physical observable obtained from an observable A of standard QM by adding a no-registration outcome a 0 , as in Ref. 1;
(ii) ∆ is a Borel set on the real line R that includes a 0 ; (iii) (A 0 ,∆) is represented by a projection operator P on the Hilbert space H of the system such that P| ϕ = | ϕ . Indeed, if A 0 is measured, one either gets outcome a 0 (x is not registered) or another outcome that belongs to ∆, since P| ϕ 2 = 1 (see Ref. 1). Analogously, one sees that a subset E ⊥ S made up by properties that are certainly false in S (that is, have probability 0 in S) exists. To be precise, E ⊥ S contains all properties of the form (A 0 ,∆) such that A 0 and ∆ are defined as in (i) and (ii), but ∆ does not include a 0 , and (A 0 ,∆) is represented by a projection operator P such that P| ϕ = 0. Thus, one obtains that the specification of the state S of x provides information about the properties in the set E S ∪ E ⊥ S . The set E S ∪E ⊥ S , however, is strictly contained in the set E of all properties, each of which is objective according to the SR model. It is indeed easy to see that there are properties in E\(E S ∪ E ⊥ S ) such that one cannot deduce from knowing S whether they are possessed or not by x. Hence, the information provided by S is incomplete within the SR model (see Sec. 4, (1) ). This has many relevant consequences. Let us point out here some of them.
Firstly, some pairwise commeasurable properties in E\(E S ∪ E ⊥ S ) can be tested, so that for each of them one can say whether it was possessed or not by x (in the state S) before the measurement, increasing our information on x without introducing contradictions. This possibility does not occur in standard QM, where a property that has not probability 1 or 0 is not real in S, and a test actualizes it, so that one can say that it is possessed or not by x only after the measurement (hence, in general, in a state that is different from S). Thus, conjoint knowledge of pairs of arbitrary properties can be obtained in some cases in the SR model. For example, whenever one can predict that x possesses a property F 1 at time t and a measurement of another property F 2 on x at t yields outcome 1, then one knows that both F 1 and F 2 are possessed by x at t, whatever F 1 and F 2 may be.
Secondly, note that the conjoint knowledge mentioned above does not survive, in general, after t, since the interaction between x and the measuring apparatus may change the state of x (this issue will be discussed in more details in Sec. 6, referring to the special case of ideal measurements). Whatever it may be, however, such a change does not imply that the properties of x must be different after the measurement: it only implies a modification of our knowledge about the properties that are certainly possessed or not possessed by x. In different words, a measurement changes our information about x, but does not change necessarily the properties of x (though a change of properties may occur because of the interaction with the measuring apparatus). Again, this perspective is different from the perspective of standard quantum measurement theory, in which a change of state implies a change of the properties that are actual for x. We briefly call epistemic conception of states in the following the new viewpoint introduced by the SR model.
The projection postulate
Our discussion of measurements within the SR model in Sec. 5 is carried out by considering the microscopic physical system and the macroscopic measuring apparatus as distinct physical entities, according to a standard elementary way of dealing with measurement processes. It is well known, however, that also at this level some crucial problems occur whenever one tries to select the subclass of apparatuses performing ideal (repeatable) measurements and treat them as macroscopic quantum systems. In particular, the vector representing a pure state of the microscopic system should undergo a deterministic unitary evolution according to the Schrödinger equation, while it should undergo a stochastic nonunitary evolution according to the projection postulate. Things are even worse if one tries to provide a more accurate description of the measurement process by considering the compound system formed by the microscopic system plus the measuring apparatus within standard QM. Indeed, two major difficulties occur in this case.
(i) Unitary evolution of the whole system is theoretically consistent but may produce a final (pure) entangled state in which neither the microscopic system nor the macroscopic apparatus possess individual properties. (25) (ii) The experimental situation at the end of a measurement is better described by a mixture of product states of the whole system (the mixture corresponding to the entangled state considered in (i) via biorthogonal decomposition), which is consistent with the projection postulate and according to which the component subsystems possess individual properties: but it is then unclear how this can be reconciled with the unitary evolution that should occur according to the basic assumptions of standard QM.
The attempts to solve the above problems have produced a huge and generally known literature, that we do not list here for the sake of brevity. Rather, we would like to provide in this section a first, qualitative treatment of these problems from the viewpoint of the SR model.
First of all, we note that we have not yet introduced any assumption about time evolution in the SR model. However, consistency with standard QM suggests one to maintain that also in this model the vector representing a pure state of the whole system undergoes unitary evolution. Furthermore, one is also led to maintain that, whenever ideal measurements are performed and the a 0 outcome does not occur, the projection postulate provides a good description of probabilities and final states of the microscopic system.
Let us come now to difficulties (i) and (ii) above. It is apparent that the assumption of unitary evolution, though identical to the standard QM assumption, does not raise any problem within the SR model when applied to the measurement process. Indeed, objectivity implies that every conceivable property 8 of the microscopic system or of the measuring apparatus either is possessed or not by the subsystem that is considered, even if one cannot generally know a priori which of the two alternatives occurs (it follows, in particular, that no special argument, or additional assumption, or modification of time evolution is needed in order to explain macroscopic objectivity). This implies that difficulty (i) disappears. Furthermore, also the contradiction in (ii) between unitary and stochastic evolution is far less relevant because of objectivity, since all properties of the component subsystems are actual according to both descriptions within the SR model. Hence, one can safely resort to the old idea of reconciling the two descriptions by assuming that one of them is theoretically rigorous, the other one is approximate. In order to implement this idea, let us provide a possible scheme of description of the measuring process within the SR model, matching the standard simplified description of this process that is used in many books in order to show in an elementary way that unitary evolution does not fit in with the projection postulate (see, e.g., Ref. 26) .
For the sake of simplicity, let us consider a discrete, nondegenerate observable A 0 , let a 0 , a 1 , a 2 , ..., a i , ... be its eigenvalues, and let | ψ 0 , | ψ 1 , | ψ 2 , ..., | ψ i , ..., respectively, be its eigenvectors. Furthermore, let | ϕ 1 , | ϕ 2 , ..., | ϕ i , ... be vectors in the Hilbert space of the microscopic system x such that, if x is in the state described by | ϕ i , either it is not detected (outcome a 0 ) or the outcome a i is obtained. Whenever the state of the whole system before the measurement is represented by the product vector | ϕ i | ψ 0 , the state at the end of the measurement is represented by the vector
the probabilities of the a i and the a 0 outcomes, respectively, and | ϕ ′ i is an unknown final state of the microscopic system. If one assumes that the whole system undergoes unitary evolution and that its state before the measurement is represented by the product vector ( i c i | ϕ i ) | ψ 0 , the state at the end of the measurement is represented by the vector
If one requires consistency with the standard picture, the state S f represented (up to a normalization constant) by the vector i c i t i | ϕ i | ψ i should coincide with the state predicted by standard QM. The above description shows that S f is generally different from the final state of all samples at the end of the measurement, and refers to the samples of the whole system in which the a 0 outcome does not occur, that are selected by the observer through direct inspection of the apparatus (which does not introduce contradictions because of the epistemic conception of states pointed out in Sec. 5; note that the selection performed by the observer plays the role of a second measurement on the whole system, without implying, however, any problematic objectification induced by the conscience of the observer himself).
Let us recall now that standard QM shows that one cannot distinguish an entangled state from the mixture corresponding to it (via biorthogonal decomposition) by simply considering probabilities of properties of the component subsystems separately. (27) But if one considers in standard QM the entangled state S f produced by unitary evolution at the end of a measurement, one may maintain that S f can be distinguished from the corresponding mixture M S f predicted via projection postulate by means of repeated measurements of the support F S f of S f on set of samples of the whole system consisting of the microscopic system plus the macroscopic measuring apparatus (see Sec. 2). This is however impossible in practice. Alternatively, one should measure a number of correlation properties by making measurements on the separate subsystems (see Sec. 2; it may also occur that different correlation properties require measuring different noncommeasurable observables on the macroscopic apparatus). But also this procedure is practically impossible, so that it is reasonable to maintain that the description of the samples in which the a 0 outcome does not occur by means of M S f is an approximation, which is equivalent FAPP (for all practical purposes) to the description provided by S f . In different words, the projection postulate is an approximate law, valid for a special class of measuring devices (performing ideal measurements) and in accessible physical situations, which avoids the complications of a complete quantum description of the measurement process and is hardly distinguishable from the correct theoretical law.
The problems following from the projection postulate are thus greatly undramatized in our perspective. However, this postulate is widely used in standard QM in order to predict the final state of a physical object after an ideal measurement that yields a given outcome. Hence, we close this section pointing out some consequences of it in the framework of the SR model and showing that these consequences are consistent with the general remarks on the measurement process within the SR model introduced in Sec. 5.
To begin with, let us observe that one can introduce a physically meaningful relation of consistency on the set of all pure states of a physical system in the SR model by saying that the pure states S 1 and S 2 are consistent iff the vectors | ϕ 1 and | ϕ 2 that represent them, respectively, are not orthogonal. Indeed, if S 1 and S 2 are consistent, there is no property that is certainly possessed by a physical object x if x is in the state S 1 and certainly not possessed if x is in the state S 2 . On the contrary, such a property exists if S 1 and S 2 are not consistent. Thus, S 1 and S 2 are consistent iff x can possess the same properties in the state S 1 and in the state S 2 (of course, we cannot know whether this actually occurs, since the knowledge of the state of a physical object provides only incomplete information about its properties, see Sec. 5).
Then, the description of measurements provided by the projection postulate has the following features in the SR model (see also Ref. 3 ).
(i) The final pure state S j of a physical object x after a measurement of an observable A 0 that yields the (possibly degenerate) eigenvalue a j is consistent with the pure state S of x before the measurement. Indeed, S and S j are represented by non-orthogonal vectors. This implies that x may possess the same properties before and after the measurement. Hence, the measurement produces a change of our information about x, but it does not necessarily imply a change of the properties of x (though a change of the set of properties possessed by x may actually occur because of the interaction of the physical object with the measuring apparatus). We thus get, by using the projection postulate, the same result that we have obtained by means of general arguments in Sec. 5 (which introduces, as we have already observed, a viewpoint that is deeply different from the viewpoint adopted by the standard quantum measurement theory).
Note that if S j and S k are the pure states predicted by the projection postulate after distinct measurements on a physical object x in the state S that yield the eigenvalues a j and a k of the observable A 0 , respectively, S j and S k are not consistent, since the vectors representing them are orthogonal. This matches with the fact that the properties F S j = "having value a j of A 0 " and F S K = "having value a k of A 0 ", that are, respectively, the supports of S j and S k , are mutually exclusive.
(ii) Let S a and S b be the pure states predicted by the projection postulate after (ideal) measurements on a physical object x in the state S that yield the eigenvalues a and b of the observables A 0 and B 0 , respectively. Then, S a and S b can be consistent even when the properties F a = "having value a of A 0 " and F b = "having value b of B 0 ", that are the supports of S a and S b , respectively, are noncommeasurable. This occurs whenever the vectors | ϕ a and | ϕ b that represent S a and S b , respectively, are not orthogonal, and intuitively means that x may possess both properties F a and F b conjointly, even if one cannot generally know whether this occurs by means of a conjoint measurement of them (yet, one can attain this knowledge in some cases by means of a prediction followed by a measurement, as we have seen in Sec. 5). Again, this feature distinguishes the viewpoint provided by the SR model from the standard interpretation, according to which F a and F b can never be simultaneously real for the physical object x.
An intuitive picture for the SR model
Our treatment of the locality and measurement problems in the previous sections has been carried out by referring to the SR model in which macroscopic properties only are considered, so that strict operational requirements are fulfilled (though the SR model does not adopt a verificationist attitude, see Ref. 1). Therefore, our perspective does not provide a picture of what is going on at the microscopic level. But if one accepts introducing microscopic properties of physical objects, one can construct an intuitive picture that "explains" the main features of the SR model that we have used throughout this paper. This picture has been recently propounded by one of us as an autonomous model (28) which provides a sample of objective interpretation of QM, and it is based on the extended SR model expounded in Ref. 1, but brings in it some relevant corrections. Let us discuss briefly this topic here.
To begin with, we accept the correspondence of microscopic and macroscopic properties established in the framework of the extended SR model. To be precise, we assume that every microscopic physical system is characterized by a set E of microscopic physical properties (which play the role of theoretical entities), and that every sample of the system (physical object) either possesses or does not possess each property in E. Moreover, every microscopic property f in E corresponds to a macroscopic property F = (A 0 ,∆), where A 0 is an observable and ∆ a Borel set on the real line such that a 0 / ∈ ∆, hence is represented by the same projection operator that represents (A 0 ,∆). Whenever a physical object x is prepared by a given preparing device π (for the sake of simplicity we assume here that the equivalence class of π is a pure state S, see Ref. 1, Sec. 2) and A 0 is measured by means of a suitable apparatus, the set of microscopic properties possessed by x produces a probability (which is either 0 or 1 if the model is deterministic) that the apparatus does not react, so that the outcome a 0 may be obtained. In this case, a nonaccessible physical situation occurs, and we cannot get any explicit information about the microscopic physical properties possessed by x. In particular, we cannot assert that they are related as the projection operators representing them are related by the laws of standard QM, which is consistent with MGP. If, on the contrary, the apparatus reacts, an outcome different from a 0 , say a, is obtained, and we are informed that x possesses all microscopic properties associated with macroscopic properties of the form F = (A 0 ,∆), where ∆ is a Borel set such that a 0 / ∈ ∆ and a ∈ ∆ (for the sake of brevity, we also say that x possesses all macroscopic properties as F in this case). Then, whenever a law of standard QM is considered, both accessible and nonaccessible physical situations may occur, and only in the former situations we can assert that the microscopic properties of x are related as the projection operators representing them in the given law.
Let us come now to our intuitive picture. Whenever the preparing device π is activated repeatedly, a (finite) set S of physical objects in the state S is prepared. Let us partition S into subsets S (1) , S (2) , ..., S (n) , such that in each subset all objects possess the same microscopic properties, and assume that a measurement of an observable A 0 is done on every object. Furthermore, let us introduce the following symbols. N: number of physical objects in S. N 0 : number of physical objects in S that are not detected. N (i) : number of physical objects in S (i) . N (i) 0 : number of physical objects in S (i) that are not detected. N (i) F : number of physical objects in S (i) that possess the macroscopic property F = (A 0 ,∆) corresponding to the microscopic property f.
It follows from our above interpretation that the number N (i) F either coincides with N (i) −N (i) 0 or with 0. The former case occurs whenever f is possessed by the objects in S (i) , since all objects that are detected then yield outcome in ∆. The latter case occurs whenever f is not possessed by the objects in S (i) , since all objects that are detected then yield outcome different from a 0 but outside ∆. In both cases one generally gets N (i) −N (i) 0 = 0 (even if N (i) −N (i) 0 = 0 may also occur, in particular in a deterministic model), so that the following equation holds:
The term on the left in Eq. (8.1) represents the frequency of objects possessing the property F in S (i) , the first term on the right the frequency of objects in S (i) that are detected, the second term (which either is 1 or 0) the frequency of objects that possess the property F in the subset of all objects in S (i) that are detected.
The frequency of objects in S that possess the property F is given by
Let us assume now that all frequencies converge in the large number limit, so that they can be substituted by probabilities, and that these probabilities do not depend on the choice of the preparation π in S (which is consistent with the definition of states in Ref. 1, Sec. 2) . Hence, if one considers the large number limit of Eq. where P (i)t S (F ) is interpreted as the overall probability that a physical object x possessing the microscopic properties that characterize S (i) also possess the property F, P (i)d S (F ) as the probability that x be detected when F is measured on it, P (i) S (F ) (which either is 0 or 1) as the probability that x possess the property F when detected. Moreover, if one considers the large number limit of Eq. (8.2), it is reasonable to assume that the second term on the right converges to the standard quantum probability P S (F ) that a physical object in the state S possess the property F, so that one gets P t S (F ) = P d S (F )P S (F ) , (8.4) where P t S (F ) is interpreted as the overall probability that a physical object x in a state S possess the property F and P d S (F ) as the probability that x be detected when F is measured on it. Thus, one can maintain that a broader theory embodying QM can be conceived, according to which the standard quantum probability P S (F ) is considered as a conditional rather than an absolute probability. Of course, Eq. (8.4) is also compatible with a model in which P d S (F ) is interpreted as the efficiency of a non-ideal measuring apparatus. Yet, our picture predicts that P d S (F ) may be less than 1 also in the case of an ideal apparatus. Indeed, every π in S prepares objects which do not possess the same microscopic properties, and some objects may possess sets of properties that make the detection of them by any apparatus measuring F possible but not certain, or even impossible.
To close up, let us note that the intuitive picture provided above introduces a substantial correction in the extended SR model that inspires it, since it substitutes Eq. (8.3) to the equation P A 0 S (F ) = P A 0 (F, G, H, ...)P S (F ) that appears in this model. Bearing in mind its definition, the probability P A 0 S (F ) can be obtained as the large number limit of the term on the left in Eq. (8.1) (which shows that the suffix S in it is rather misleading). Analogously, the probability P A 0 (F, G, H, ...) can be obtained as the large number limit of the first term on the right in the same equation. However, the second term on the right in Eq. (8.1) does not converge to the quantum probability P S (F ), hence the above equation of the extended SR model is not correct in our new picture. We observe, however, that also in this picture the fair sampling assumption does not hold, which is important for theoretical reasons (see Ref. 1, Sec. 5) .
